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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Fair Housing Council of Suburban Philadelphia 
("FHC") appeals an order of the district court granting 
summary judgment in favor of Montgomery Newspapers 
("Montgomery"), the papers' publisher, and their classified 
advertisements editor in an action filed pursuant to the 
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 3604 and 3617, and the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. S 955. The 
district court's grant of summary judgment was based on 
its conclusion that the FHC lacked standing under Article 
III of the United States Constitution to maintain this suit. 
Because we are convinced by the unique set of facts 
surrounding the section 3604(c) claims that the FHC has 
failed to satisfy the "injury in fact" requirement embodied in 
Article III, we find that the grant of summary judgment as 
to those claims was appropriate. As to the section 3617 
retaliation claims, however, we find that the FHC has raised 
issues of fact sufficient to withstand Montgomery's motion 
for summary judgment. We will, therefore, reverse the 
district court's entry of summary judgment as to the 
retaliation claim and remand for further consideration. 
 
I. 
 
The FHC, a fair housing group which has operated in the 
Philadelphia area for more than forty years, defines itself as 
a non-profit organization whose "purpose is to educate and 
promote fair housing and to oppose segregation based on 
the protected classes found in the Fair Housing Act of 
1968, as amended." On April 6, 1994, the FHCfiled a 
complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commission ("PHRC") and HUD alleging that from 
November 24, 1993 forward, Montgomery "accepted and 
published advertisements that were discriminatory based 
on gender and familial status" in violation of state and 
federal law. The complaint included copies of six 
advertisements which appeared in Montgomery newspapers 
between November, 1993 and March, 1994. Each of these 
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advertisements contained one of the following allegedly 
objectionable phrases: "mature person"; "ideal for quiet and 
reserved single and-or couple"; "professional male . . . only"; 
and "quiet mature setting." On January 5, 1996, the PHRC 
notified the FHC that "investigation of the complaint [had] 
resulted in a Finding of Probable Cause. . . ." 
 
According to the FHC, Montgomery "continued publishing 
discriminatory speech." Therefore on February 21, 1996, 
the FHC filed suit in district court. An amended complaint 
was filed on April 10, 1996. In the amended complaint, the 
FHC alleged that Montgomery's acceptance and publication 
of discriminatory housing advertisements frustrated the 
organization's mission and resulted in damage to the 
organization caused by the need to divert resources to fight 
the discrimination. The FHC also alleged that as a result of 
the discriminatory advertisements, "families with children 
were barred from housing" in violation of state and federal 
law. 
 
The amended complaint added allegations that 
Montgomery had intimidated, coerced, interfered with and 
retaliated against the FHC as a result of the FHC's 
complaint against Montgomery. The FHC contended that in 
newspaper articles, testimony before the state legislature, 
and other false statements made by or on behalf of 
Montgomery, the FHC had been placed in a position of 
ridicule which impaired the organization's effectiveness. 
 
On September 25, 1996, Montgomery filed a motion for 
summary judgment which was granted on January 6, 
1997. The district court held that the FHC lacked standing 
to pursue any of the claims alleged. 
 
In arriving at this conclusion the district court separated 
the FHC's damage claims into three categories: (1) 
frustration of the FHC mission; (2) diversion of resources to 
measures designed to correct the harm caused by the 
discriminatory advertising; and (3) diversion of resources to 
litigation. 
 
Analyzing the first category of claims, the court found 
that frustration of an organization's mission can never, as 
a matter of law, suffice to satisfy the Article III requirement 
of injury in fact. With respect to the alleged diversion of 
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resources to programs designed to counteract the 
discrimination, the district court found that the FHC "failed 
to set forth specific evidence demonstrating that its various 
programs have been `perceptibly impaired as a result of the 
diversion of its resources . . . to activities counteracting 
[the] allegedly discriminatory acts.' [P]laintiff has failed . . . 
to initiate any such educational program or to expend any 
funds at all on the development of such a program." Fair 
Housing Council v. Montgomery Newspapers, 1997 WL 5185 
*7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 1997). 
 
The court also rejected the FHC's argument that it had 
suffered injury for purposes of Article III when it was forced 
to divert resources from other programs to the pursuit of 
litigation. "[S]uch an injury cannot constitute, as a matter 
of law, an injury in fact." Id. at *6. The court reasoned that 
finding this type of injury sufficient would mean that an 
organization would be able to "manufacture the injury 
necessary to maintain a suit from its expenditure of 
resources on that very suit." Id. at *5 (quoting Spann v. 
Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
 
This timely appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
In order to place the district court's holding and our 
review of that holding in context, we turn first to the law 
governing standing in general. Constitutional standing 
requirements have been articulated often. The Supreme 
Court summarized the history and parameters of those 
requirements most recently in Raines v. Byrd, ___ U.S. ___, 
117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997). Article III S 2 of the Constitution 
confers jurisdiction in the federal courts over"cases" and 
"controversies." "One element of the case or controversy 
requirement is that [the plaintiffs], based on their 
complaint, must establish that they have standing to sue. 
The standing inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff is the 
proper party to bring this suit." Id. at 2317 (citation 
omitted). 
 
The standing inquiry in most cases is two-tiered, 
involving "both constitutional limitations on federal-court 
jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise." 
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Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). First, a plaintiff 
must satisfy the "case" or "controversy" requirement of 
Article III. This requirement has been described as 
"immutable", Bennett v. Spear, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 
1154, 1163 (1997) and as the "irreducible constitutional 
minimum." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560 (1992). The standing requirements embodied in the 
"case" or "controversy" provision of Article III mean that in 
every case, the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate: 
 
       An "injury in fact" -- an invasion of a judicially 
       cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and 
       particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 
       conjectural or hypothetical; second, there be a causal 
       connection between the injury and the conduct 
       complained of -- the injury has to be "fairly trace[able] 
       to the challenged action of the defendant, and not .. . 
       the result [of] the independent action of some third 
       party not before the court. Third, it must be "likely," as 
       opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be 
       "redressed by a favorable decision." 
 
Id. at 560-61. Each of these elements of Article III standing 
"must be supported in the same way as any other matter 
on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with 
the manner and degree of evidence required at the 
successive stages of the litigation." Bennett v. Spear, at 
1163-64 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). 
 
Even where this constitutional minimum has been met, 
courts have developed other standing principles which may 
be invoked to defeat a plaintiff's standing to pursue a 
claim. 
 
       In addition to the immutable requirements of Article III, 
       "the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of 
       prudential principles that bear on the issue of 
       standing." Like their constitutional counterparts, these 
       "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal 
       jurisdiction" are "founded in concern about the proper 
       -- and properly limited -- role of the courts in a 
       democratic society" but unlike their constitutional 
       counterparts, they can be modified or abrogated by 
       Congress. 
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Id. at 1161 (citations omitted). These second-tier prudential 
limits on standing deal with who is authorized to invoke the 
courts' decisional and remedial powers. The Supreme Court 
in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975), 
summarized these prudential limits as follows: 
 
       Apart from [the] minimum constitutional mandate, this 
       court has recognized other limits . . . . First, the Court 
       has held that when the asserted harm is a "generalized 
       grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by all 
       or a large class of citizens, that harm alone does not 
       warrant exercise of jurisdiction. Second, even when the 
       plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the "case 
       or controversy" requirements, this Court has held that 
       the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights 
       and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the 
       legal rights or interests of other parties. Without such 
       limitations 
       . . . the courts would be called upon to decide abstract 
       questions of wide public significance even though other 
       governmental institutions may be more competent . . . 
       and judicial intervention may be unnecessary to 
       protect individual rights. 
 
(Citations omitted.) 
 
Congress may grant an express right of action to those 
who would otherwise lack standing due to application of 
the prudential requirements. So long as the Article III 
minimum requirements are met, a plaintiff may, where 
Congress directs, have standing to "seek relief on the basis 
of the legal rights and interests of others, and . .. may 
invoke the general public interest. . . ." Id. at 500. 
Prudential standing requirements have been eliminated in 
cases arising under the Fair Housing Act ("the Act").1 The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 642 U.S.C. S 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful: 
 
       To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or 
       published any notice, statement, or advertisement with respect to 
       the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, 
       limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, 
       handicap, familial status, or national origin or an intention to 
make 
       any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 
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Supreme Court has established that Congress intended 
that standing under the Fair Housing Act be limited only by 
Article III and that the courts, as a result, may not create 
prudential barriers to standing under the Act. "[T]he sole 
requirement for standing to sue [under the Fair Housing 
Act] is the Art. III minima [sic] of injury in fact: that the 
plaintiff allege that as a result of the defendant's actions he 
has suffered `a distinct and palpable injury.' " Havens 
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982) 
(citations omitted). 
 
III. 
 
In this matter we must decide whether the FHC has 
shown "distinct and palpable injury" sufficient to satisfy 
Article III standing requirements under the Fair Housing 
Act. The parameters of the injury requirement were 
addressed by the Supreme Court in Havens Realty Corp. v. 
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). In Havens, a realty company 
and one of its employees were alleged to have engaged in 
racial "steering" in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The 
plaintiffs included a housing organization, Housing 
Opportunities Made Equal ("HOME"), which had a mission 
generally similar to that of the FHC here. HOME alleged 
that it had suffered injury as a result of the "steering," 
claiming that its counseling and referral services had been 
frustrated with a consequent drain on its resources. The 
complaint also contained allegations that individual 
plaintiffs had been "deprived . . . of the . . . benefits of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Act provides that "an aggrieved person may commence a civil action 
in an appropriate United States district court. . . .", S 3613(a)(1)(A), 
and 
defines an "aggrieved person" (including corporations and associations) 
as: 
 
       any person who-- 
       (1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing 
practice; 
       or 
       (2) believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory 
       housing practice that is about to occur. 
 
Section 3602(I). 
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interracial associations that arise from living in integrated 
communities free from discriminatory housing practices." 
Id. at 369. The Supreme Court held that HOME was 
entitled to sue in its own right. 
 
After explaining that standing under the Fair Housing Act 
is constrained only by Article III requirements and outlining 
those requirements, the Court wrote: 
 
       In determining whether HOME has standing under the 
       Fair Housing Act, we conduct the same inquiry as in 
       the case of an individual: Has the plaintiff " `alleged 
       such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
       controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal 
       court jurisdiction?" . . . If, as broadly alleged, 
       petitioner's . . . practices have perceptibly impaired 
       HOME's ability to provide counseling and referral 
       services for low- and moderate-income homeseekers, 
       there can be no question that the organization has 
       suffered injury in fact. Such concrete and demonstrable 
       injury to the organization's activities -- with the 
       consequent drain on the organization's resources-- 
       constitutes far more than simply a setback to the 
       organization's abstract social interests. 
 
Id. 455 U.S. at 378-79 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
Before we analyze the FHC's particular allegations of 
harm, we note that there is a critical distinction between 
Havens and this case. In Havens, the plaintiff 's damage 
allegations were examined in the context of a motion to 
dismiss. Here, however, the issue of standing was before 
the district court on a motion for summary judgment. While 
there is no dispute that the FHC's damage allegations2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In its amended complaint the FHC made the following allegations 
bearing on injury: 
 
       10. [E]ach act of discrimination conducted in the Delaware Valley 
       causes a setback to the good work accomplished by the FHC's 
       educational outreach efforts and to the development of an 
integrated 
       housing community. As a result, the FHC must launch further 
       efforts to undo the damage that the discrimination has caused . . . 
. 
       The further efforts required are a substantial drain on its 
resources 
       and harms [sic] the FHC. 
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track the language in Havens and were sufficient to 
withstand a motion to dismiss, something more than these 
naked allegations was required at the summary judgment 
stage. "Since [the elements of standing] are not mere 
pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of 
the plaintiff's case, each element must be supported in the 
same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears 
the burden of proof, i.e. with the manner and degree of 
evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
 
In order to defeat the summary judgment motion based 
on the issue of standing, the FHC was required to submit 
"affidavits or other evidence showing through specific facts 
. . . that . . . it [was] `directly' affected [by the alleged 
discrimination]." Id. at 562 (emphasis added). According to 
the district court, the FHC failed to carry its burden at 
summary judgment, producing nothing of substance to 
support the mere allegations set forth in the complaint. As 
to the discrimination claims, we agree. 
 
IV. 
 
Because both the FHC and the district court considered 
by category the damage claims based on alleged 
discrimination, we do the same, turning first to the 
allegations regarding frustration of mission. In an effort to 
establish standing, the FHC argued that the discriminatory 
advertisements "cause[d] a setback to the good work 
accomplished by the FHC's educational outreach efforts 
and to the development of an integrated housing 
community." The district court rejected this alleged 
"frustration of mission" as a basis for organizational 
standing, stating that "such an injury cannot constitute, as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       20. As a result of the conduct of the Defendants, persons were 
       injured in their person and property. Specifically, families with 
       children were barred from housing in violation of the . . . Act of 
       1968 . . . . Further, the FHC is now forced to divert funds to 
       counteract the discriminatory message and acts of Defendants and 
       has had its purpose frustrated by Defendants' discriminatory 
       conduct. 
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a matter of law, an `injury in fact.' " Fair Housing Council, 
1997 WL 5185 at *4. This is not an accurate statement of 
the law. Havens made clear that where discriminatory 
"practices have perceptibly impaired [an organization's 
ability to carry out its mission], there can be no question 
that the organization has suffered injury in fact." 455 U.S. 
at 379. Nonetheless, we are convinced that the allegations 
of frustration of mission were insufficient to defeat 
summary judgment as the FHC failed to substantiate any 
perceptible impairment to its mission. 
 
The FHC contends that its mission suffered the 
impairment required to establish standing when it was 
forced to divert resources from counseling and other 
activities to: (1) an educational campaign designed to 
counteract the discriminatory effect of the advertisements; 
(2) an investigation designed to determine the existence and 
extent of on-going discrimination in advertising; and (3) 
litigation. We address the FHC's alleged diversion of 
resources in each of these categories seriatim. 
 
A. 
 
We turn first to the FHC's claim that it was damaged by 
the need to divert funds "over the course of three years to 
repair damage caused by" the discriminatory 
advertisements. Although pressed to do so in discovery and 
in oral argument before us, the FHC was unable to 
establish any connection between the allegedly 
discriminatory advertisements underlying this suit and the 
need for or implementation of a remedial educational 
campaign. The FHC was unable to verify that any member 
of the public had been denied housing or was deterred from 
seeking housing based on the advertisements. The FHC was 
also unable to establish that any member of the public 
complained about the contents of the advertisements or 
formed a misimpression about the legality of their contents. 
In fact, the FHC was unable to show that anyone other 
than the FHC staff even read the relevant advertisements.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We do not, as the dissent argues, impose a bona-fide home-seeker 
requirement. We adhere instead to the letter of the caselaw which clearly 
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Not only did the FHC fail to introduce evidence of the need 
for an educational program, it failed to show that any 
educational effort was ever implemented. 
 
The only evidence relating to implementation of an 
educational effort was the FHC's allegation that, at some 
future time, it would be required to spend almost $100,000 
in newspaper advertising and over $300,000 in seminars 
and mailings to reach consumers to counter the 
advertisements' discriminatory message. Although the 
questionable advertisements were published in 1993 and 
1994, the FHC admitted that it has yet to undertake any 
educational countermeasures or to offer counseling directed 
at reversing the damage alleged to have been caused by the 
advertisements. The FHC was unable to say when such 
measures might be undertaken or when funds might 
actually be expended in support of this educational effort. 
These inchoate plans for future programs are insufficient to 
demonstrate injury for purposes of Article III: 
 
       Such "some day" intentions -- without any description 
       of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of 
       when the some day will be -- do not support afinding 
       of the "actual or imminent" injury that our cases 
       require. 
 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 564.4 The FHC's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
establishes that an alleged injury must be shown to flow from the 
conduct alleged. Where, as here, the record fails to show that any 
housing provider, real estate professional, or member of the public ever 
saw the advertisements specified, the essential causal nexus between the 
advertisements and the injury alleged is missing. Contrary to what the 
dissent suggests, the injury alleged must result from the particular 
discriminatory acts, not from the general conduct of multiple parties over 
the course of years. 
 
4. While the dissent argues that "the cases are legion supporting a 
conclusion that the FHC is not required to actually pay for the 
advertising campaign before it can assert standing," the cases cited 
differ 
fundamentally from this one in that they address circumstances where 
an injury is threatened. These cases hold that where the threat of injury 
is real, a plaintiff will not be denied standing. Here, however, injury is 
alleged to have already occurred. The FHC argues that it suffered injury 
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failure to document the need for corrective education 
engendered by the advertisements cited, coupled with the 
fact that it has yet to devote any of its resources to pursuit 
of an educational campaign, undermines its claim to have 
suffered actual injury. The record is devoid of evidence that 
the FHC was required to modify any of its services in 
response to the objectionable advertisements. 
 
B. 
 
The FHC's claim that it suffered palpable injury when it 
was forced to divert resources to investigation also fails for 
lack of proof. The "investigation" to which the FHC refers 
consisted of having its staff members review classified 
advertisements placed in Montgomery and other suburban 
Philadelphia newspapers on an ongoing basis for evidence 
of discrimination. This investigation is alleged to have 
necessitated a diversion of staff resources which could have 
been directed to counseling and other organizational 
functions. The record fails, however, to establish any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
when it diverted resources to an education campaign. Yet, in the more 
than three years following publication of the relevant advertisements, the 
FHC has failed to implement the campaign. 
 
The dissent's reliance on Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1997), to support standing based 
on plans alone is also misplaced. In Arlington Heights, a housing 
organization generated blueprints and building plans in preparation for 
the construction of low-income housing. These plans were thwarted by 
the defendant's denial of a zoning request. The Supreme Court held that 
where "the challenged action [stood] as an absolute barrier to 
constructing the housing that [the plaintiff] contracted to place on the 
site" and the planned project was "detailed and specific," the "court 
[was] 
not required to engage in undue speculation as a predicate for finding 
that the plaintiff has the requisite personal stake in the controversy." 
Id. 
At 261-62. In Arlington Heights, the defendant's thwarting of plans 
constituted the injury; the plans could not be effected due to the 
defendant's conduct. In this case, by contrast, the record does not show 
that the need for an educational effort resulted from or was connected in 
any clear way to the six allegedly discriminatory advertisements. 
Moreover, the advertisements at issue did not impede the FHC's ability 
to implement its educational plan. 
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connection between this investigation and the 
 538<!>advertisements which form the basis for this suit. 
 
Depositions of members of the FHC staff established that 
the purchase of newspapers and review of the classified 
sections which comprised the "investigation" went on as 
part of the FHC's normal day-to-day operations. This 
"investigation" was not motivated by the advertisements at 
issue in this suit or by a complaint about advertising. It 
was not limited to Montgomery newspapers, and did not 
increase or go on longer than it otherwise might have as a 
result of the allegedly discriminatory advertising alleged 
here.5 
 
The record before us does not establish that the FHC 
altered its operations in any way as a result of the allegedly 
discriminatory advertisements or diverted any of its 
resources to a bona fide investigation. At the summary 
judgment stage, bare allegations of injury such as those 
based on the "investigation" described are not enough to 
establish standing. This is true even where, as here, an 
organization holds the status of a private attorney general 
charged with enforcing the provisions of the Fair Housing 
Act. A private attorney general is subject to the following 
rule: 
 
       [A]s long as [the private attorney general] suffers actual 
       injury as a result of the defendant's conduct, he is 
       permitted to prove that the rights of another were 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The "investigation" undertaken here differs dramatically from that 
described in Havens. There, the investigation and the allegedly 
discriminatory acts were closely linked. Moreover, it was clear that the 
organization in Havens did something different as a result of the 
particular conduct which was alleged to be illegal. The case before us is 
fundamentally different. The record does not support the conclusion that 
the FHC in conducting its investigation, responded to the advertisements 
at issue or that it would not have undertaken the same investigative 
efforts in the absence of these advertisements. Although the dissent's 
argument that the "investigation" here was sufficient to impart standing 
is appealing, it is simply not supported by the record or by the caselaw. 
We cannot conclude, and the dissent does not point to anything in the 
record which would allow us to conclude that the"investigation" was 
connected in any concrete way to the specific acts of discrimination 
alleged in this suit. 
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       infringed. The central issue at this stage of the 
       proceedings is not who possesses the legal rights . . . 
       but whether [the plaintiffs] were genuinely injured by 
       conduct that violates someone's . . . rights, and thus 
       are entitled to seek redress of that harm. . . . 
 
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 
n.9 (1979) (emphasis added). 
 
As the district court found, there is no credible evidence 
of injury to the FHC other than the dedication of funds and 
other resources to pursuit of this litigation. The FHC 
contends that the diversion of resources to litigation is 
alone sufficient to confer standing under Article III. We 
disagree. 
 
C. 
 
In deciding organizational standing questions after 
Havens, appellate courts have generally agreed that where 
an organization alleges or is able to show - depending on 
the stage of the proceeding - that it has devoted additional 
resources to some area of its effort in order to counteract 
discrimination, the organization has met the Article III 
standing requirement. A number of our sister courts have, 
however, adopted different views of whether the injury 
necessary to establish standing flows automatically from 
the expenses associated with litigation.6  We align ourselves 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC 
Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Havens did not base 
standing on diversion of resources but on injury caused to organization's 
programs); Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 
(fair housing organization cannot manufacture the injury necessary to 
maintain a suit from its expenditure of resources on that very suit); 
Ragin v. Macklowe, 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993) (housing organization had 
standing to sue based on diversion of resources to pursue litigation and 
other legal efforts to counteract the discrimination); Hooker v. Weathers, 
990 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1993) (fair housing organization had standing 
based on investigation using testers and confirmation of facts and 
circumstances alleged in complaint); Housing Opportunities Made Equal, 
Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1991) (injury 
may 
be found where group must devote additional resources to investigating 
and negating impact of discriminatory advertising independent of suit 
challenging the advertisements); Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 
1521 (7th Cir. 1990) (to have standing fair housing organization need 
only show deflection of time and money from counseling to legal efforts). 
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with those courts holding that litigation expenses alone do 
not constitute damage sufficient to support standing. 
 
We are persuaded to take this position by the analysis 
set forth by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 
Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
In Spann, the court of appeals read Havens narrowly, 
holding that in order to establish standing, an organization 
must point to a "concrete and demonstrable injury to [its] 
activities." Id. at 27. The court explained that merely 
devoting funds to support a lawsuit will not suffice to 
establish an injury within the scope of Article III: 
 
       An organization cannot, of course, manufacture the 
       injury necessary to maintain a suit from its 
       expenditure of resources on that very suit. Were the 
       rule otherwise, any litigant could create injury in fact 
       by bringing a case, and Article III would present no real 
       limitation. 
 
Id. The Court in Spann summarized the holding in Havens 
as follows: 
 
       Havens makes clear . . . that an organization 
       establishes Article III injury if it alleges that 
       purportedly illegal action increased the resources the 
       group must devote to programs independent of the suit 
       challenging the action. 
 
Id. (Emphasis added.) 
 
Under this standard, something more than litigation is 
required to establish injury. In Spann, it was the 
organization's "expenditures to reach out to potential home 
buyers or renters who are steered away from housing 
opportunities by discriminatory advertising or to monitor 
and to counteract on an ongoing basis public impressions 
created by defendants' use of print media" -- expenditures 
of a type not made in this case -- which satisfied the injury 
requirement of Article III. Id. at 29. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed its 
commitment to a narrow reading of Havens in Fair 
Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC 
Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994): 
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       [Havens] did not base standing on the diversion of 
       resources from one program to another, but rather on 
       the alleged injury that the defendants' actions 
       themselves had inflicted upon the organization's 
       programs. To be sure, the Court did mention the "drain 
       on the organization's resources." Yet this drain 
       apparently sprang from the organization's need to 
       "counteract" the defendants' assertedly illegal 
       practices, and thus was simply another manifestation 
       of the injury that those practices had inflicted upon 
       "the organization's non-economic interest in 
       encouraging open housing" . . . . 
 
The FHC urges us to reject the analysis set forth in 
Spann and BMC Marketing and to embrace instead the 
result reached by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in City of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th 
Cir. 1990). In Bellwood, a real estate brokerage firm and 
two of its employees were sued for discriminatory practices 
alleged to violate the Act. On appeal of a jury verdict in 
favor of the plaintiffs, the court considered whether a 
nonprofit corporation promoting integrated housing lacked 
Article III standing. Relying on the decision in Havens the 
court found that the organization did have standing: 
 
       Havens makes clear . . . that the only injury which 
       must be shown to confer standing on a fair housing 
       agency is deflection of the agency's time and money 
       from counseling to legal efforts directed against 
       discrimination. These are opportunity costs of 
       discrimination since although the counseling is not 
       impaired directly there would be more of it were it not 
       for the defendant's discrimination. 
 
Id. at 1526 (emphasis added). 
 
The district court in this matter declined to follow  
Bellwood.7 We are convinced that the district court's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We are convinced that the FHC overstates the breadth of the holding 
in Bellwood. The holding in Bellwood was not that litigation alone 
constituted injury sufficient to convey standing. In Bellwood, the village 
undertook a bona fide investigation of a number of real estate agencies 
in order to determine whether these agencies were engaged in racial 
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reliance on the position taken in Spann and BMC Marketing 
represents the better-reasoned approach. We hold, 
therefore, that the pursuit of litigation alone cannot 
constitute an injury sufficient to establish standing under 
Article III. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that we 
 
       have no doubt about the sincerity of [the FHC's] stated 
       objectives and the depth of their commitment to them. 
       But the essence of standing "is not a question of 
       motivation but of possession of the requisite interest 
       that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the 
       unconstitutional conduct." 
 
Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 
225-26 (1973) (quoting Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 
U.S. 429, 435 (1952)). 
 
We emphasize, too, that this holding does not 
compromise our commitment to the laudable goal advanced 
by the FHC; eliminating discrimination in housing is vitally 
important. We cannot agree, however, that this goal should 
be attained by an approach which shrinks the Article III 
standing requirement to a point where the requisite injury 
flows automatically from the burdens associated with filing 
a lawsuit. Resort to this extreme position simply is not 
necessary. The hurdle raised by the injury element of 
established standing principles is not a high one. Fair 
housing organizations have regularly and successfully 
shown injury in litigating suits designed to eradicate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
steering. The fair housing organization was hired to carry out the testing 
by sending both black and white "clients" to the real estate agencies. 
When the tests revealed that steering was taking place, the village, the 
fair housing organization and the testers filed suit. In holding that the 
organization had standing to sue, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit held that the organization's "legal efforts" to investigate 
steering 
were sufficient to confer standing. Litigation plus some other legal 
effort 
-- there, investigation -- provided the basis for standing. Because the 
FHC did not devote time and resources to legal efforts short of 
litigation, 
to adopt the dissent's argument and find that the injury requirement has 
been met in this case would require that we go beyond the result 
reached in Bellwood. 
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discrimination illegal under the Fair Housing Act. Our 
decision should not restrict or impede in any meaningful 
way the ability of these organizations to combat violations 
of the Act. Where discrimination does, in fact, occur, it 
should not be insurmountably difficult for these 
organizations to establish standing either in their own right 
or on behalf of their members by referring to well- 
established standing principles and adjusting their 
pleadings and proof accordingly. 
 
V. 
 
We turn next to the FHC's retaliation claim. In Count II 
of the amended complaint, the FHC alleges that 
Montgomery violated section 3617 of the Act8 by knowingly 
and maliciously creating, publishing in its newspapers, and 
mailing to the legislators of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, false statements about the FHC, its actions 
and its motivations. The district court granted 
Montgomery's motion for summary judgment on this claim, 
again on the basis of standing: 
 
       [The FHC] has not set forth any evidence indicating 
       that it has suffered . . . an "injury in fact" from 
       defendant's newspaper publications or statements to 
       legislators. The deposition testimony offered by [the 
       FHC] reveals instead that [it] has not lost any revenue, 
       income, government contracts, or members as a result 
       of the publications and statements at issue . . . As[the 
       FHC] has not established that it has suffered an "injury 
       in fact" from said publications and statements, this 
       Court concludes that the FHC does not have standing 
       to bring this claim. 
 
Fair Housing Council v. Montgomery Newspapers, 1997 WL 
5185 at * 9-10. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. This section provides that: 
 
        It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten or interfere 
       with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of 
his 
       having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or 
       encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any 
       right granted or protected by [other sections] of this title. 
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We have examined the district court's conclusion in light 
of the record and are convinced that the evidence adduced 
by the FHC with respect to the retaliation claim was 
sufficient to withstand Montgomery's motion for summary 
judgment. 
 
In support of its argument that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment on this claim, the FHC directs 
our attention to the following excerpt from the affidavit of 
James Berry, Executive Director of the FHC: 
 
       7. Some of the falsehoods of defendants were 
       communicated to one of the FHC's primary federal 
       grant funders, and to fair housing advocates around 
       the country. As a result, at least in part, of these 
       falsehoods, [the FHC] was investigated by that primary 
       federal grant funder, and has been questioned by fair 
       housing advocates concerning the FHC's practices as to 
       following the law. [The FHC's] reputation in the fair 
       housing and grant provider communities has been 
       damaged. 
 
       8. [The FHC has] learned . . . that HUD, who received 
       defendants' falsehoods, will not renew one of its grants 
       to [the FHC]. The grant was worth hundreds of 
       thousands of dollars. 
 
The FHC cites, too, Berry's testimony in deposition that 
he was contacted by a representative of the Fair Housing 
Initiatives Program (FHIP), a government entity, seeking to 
arrange a conference call between Berry and the FHIP 
director in order to discuss the substance of lawsuits filed 
by the FHC. Berry was informed that: 
 
       Somebody in the Department of Housing and Urban 
       Development had read an article that went out over the 
       Associated Press containing the lies that Mr. Howe had 
       testified to in front of the Pennsylvania state 
       legislature. 
 
The FHIP representative informed Berry that FHIP 
personnel had "read about [the FHC] and are very 
concerned, they've had inquiries from Congress as well as 
the White House." Berry testified that he was then required 
to discuss the terms and phrases underlying FHC lawsuits 
with FHIP representatives. 
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Without considering any other part of the record cited by 
the FHC, we are convinced that there was sufficient 
evidence before the district court at summary judgment to 
establish a triable issue of fact with respect to the 
retaliation claim. Berry's uncontroverted testimony 
indicates, at a minimum, that Montgomery's statements in 
the press forced the FHC to answer questions posed by 
FHIP and to defend the basis for FHC litigation. Through 
this testimony, the FHC has offered proof that it sustained 
at least non-economic harm which was "concrete" and 
"particularized" and "actual" or "imminent." See Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 560-61. Accordingly, the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of Montgomery on the 
retaliation claim. 
 
VI. 
 
Because we conclude that the FHC succeeded in 
establishing an "injury in fact" sufficient to withstand 
Montgomery's motion for summary judgment on the section 
3617 claims, we will reverse that portion of the order of the 
district court granting summary judgment to Montgomery 
on these claims. In all other respects, we will affirm the 
order of the district court. 
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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 
I agree that the Fair Housing Council has standing to 
assert a claim of retaliation against Montgomery 
Newspapers under 42 U.S.C. S 3617. However, I would go 
further and also conclude that the FHC has standing to 
assert a claim of illegal advertising under 42 U.S.C. 
S 3604(c), and that the FHC is injured because it must 
divert resources to a large-scale educational campaign to 
inform landlords, real estate agents, consumers and the 
defendant newspaper itself that discrimination based on 
familial status violates the Fair Housing Act. The FHC has 
proffered evidence that education is necessary because 
housing providers were continuing to write advertisements 
that violated 42 U.S.C. S 3604(c), and the defendant itself, 
Montgomery Newspapers, was continuing to publish the 
illegal advertisements and promote misunderstanding of the 
familial status provisions of the Act. 
 
The majority's view of standing is too narrow, and I am 
convinced that its opinion will do violence to the law of 
standing in this circuit. The majority suggests that to be 
injured, the FHC must have either implemented the 
educational campaign or submitted a more detailed plan to 
the district court. In the alternative, the majority states that 
the FHC could have produced a home seeker who was 
denied housing, deterred from seeking housing, or formed 
a misimpression about housing availability as a result of 
the advertisements published in the Montgomery 
Newspapers. The majority opines that the FHC did not 
demonstrate the need for the educational program and also 
failed to show that the plan was implemented. I disagree. 
The FHC has submitted a detailed plan for its educational 
campaign, within which it describes exactly why the 
campaign is a necessary response to the advertisements. 
This plan is sufficiently concrete to confer standing. 
Furthermore, the FHC does not have to produce an 
aggrieved home seeker because it has clearly demonstrated 
the need for an educational campaign to counter the 
advertisements that were placed by housing providers in 
flagrant disregard of 42 U.S.C. S 3604(c). 
 
The majority also concludes that investigation and 
litigation costs alone cannot confer standing. Because I find 
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standing for educational costs, it would ordinarily not be 
necessary for me to reach this issue. However, I write 
separately on this issue as well, because I think that costs 
incurred applying legal pressure to a newspaper publishing 
illegal advertisements can confer standing. 
 
I. Article III Standing Requirements 
 
A plaintiff organization has standing if it meets the 
immutable requirements of Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an 
injury in fact, an invasion of a legally protected interest that 
is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). Second, 
there must be a causal connection between the injury and 
the challenged action of the defendant. The injury has to be 
fairly traceable to the defendant's actions, and not the 
result of the independent action of a party not before the 
court. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 
26, 41-42, 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1926 (1976). Third, it must be 
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will 
be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
561, 112 S. Ct. at 2136; Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43, 96 S. 
Ct. at 1924, 1926.1 When the Supreme Court considered a 
fair housing organization's standing to sue under the Fair 
Housing Act, it concluded that Congress intended to 
abrogate any additional prudential standing requirements 
and allow standing based only upon the constitutional 
requirements of Article III. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 
455 U.S. 363, 372, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 1121 (1982) (citing 
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 
n.9, 109, 99 S. Ct. 1601, 1609 n. 9, 1612 (1979)). 
 
Havens held that the plaintiff organization had standing 
to sue because the activity that allegedly violated the Fair 
Housing Act perceptibly impaired its counseling and 
referral services. This impairment met the "injury in fact" 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court only addressed the first element of standing, 
holding 
that the FHC did not show Article III injury. Accordingly, I do not 
address the final two elements of causation and redressability, although 
I will point out that those two elements are clearly present here. 
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test because a concrete and demonstrable drain on 
resources is a more plausible injury than a conjectural 
"setback" to an organization's abstract social interests. Id. 
at 379 (distinguishing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 
92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972)). Following Havens, the Courts of 
Appeals have agreed that a fair housing organization will 
have standing to challenge a newspaper's advertising 
practices under 42 U.S.C. S 3604(c) if it can demonstrate 
that the newspaper's discriminatory advertising caused the 
organization to divert resources to identify and negate the 
impact of those advertisements. See, e.g., Fair Employment 
Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 
F.3d 1268, 1276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Housing Opportunities 
Made Equal, Inc. v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644 
(6th Cir. 1991); Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 
27 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The FHC has clearly met this burden. 
 
The Circuits are split, though, as to whether the 
diversion of resources solely for litigation and investigation 
activities can confer standing. Compare Spann, 899 F.2d at 
27 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (litigation costs cannot confer standing), 
with Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 
905 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding standing based on staff time 
spent exclusively on litigation), and Hooker v. Weathers, 
990 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1993) (investigation to confirm 
facts in complaint insufficient to confer standing), and City 
of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Ctr., Inc., 982 
F.2d 1086, 1095 (7th Cir. 1992) (legal efforts directed 
against discrimination are sufficient to impart standing). 
The majority holds that the litigation and investigation 
costs cannot confer standing. I disagree and would hold 
that in some situations, like this case, they can constitute 
an Article III injury. 
 
II. Educational Injury 
 
A. Sufficiency of Evidence 
 
As explained above, the courts interpreting Havens agree 
that the diversion of resources to educational programs is 
sufficient to impart Article III standing. See, e.g., Spann, 
899 F.2d at 27. A "concrete drain on time and resources is 
sufficient to satisfy Article III's injury in fact requirement." 
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Spann, 899 F.2d at 29. An "identifiable trifle" of this type of 
injury will suffice to confer standing upon the FHC.2 United 
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14, 93 S. Ct. 2405, 2417 
n.14 (1973) (rejecting the argument that standing should be 
limited to those significantly injured, and ruling that any 
level of injury is sufficient to confer standing). Accordingly, 
to demonstrate "educational injury," the FHC must only 
raise a genuine issue of material fact that its plan to 
educate the real estate industry and consumers will be a 
concrete and demonstrable drain on its resources, and that 
such education is necessary to counter the illegal housing 
advertisements. 
 
The FHC has presented sufficient evidence of injury to 
compel my conclusion that Montgomery Newspapers is not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. James Berry, the 
executive director of the FHC, described the campaign by 
which the FHC will attempt to educate real estate 
professionals. Berry also stated that the FHC will have to 
spend almost $100,000 in newspaper advertising to counter 
Montgomery News' discriminatory messages. Jan Chadwick, 
Assistant Director of the FHC, explained that the FHC has 
formulated "an educational plan that would educate both 
the public and the industry what the proper Fair Housing 
laws are . . . to reverse the damages [caused by 
discrimination] in the whole region, specifically families 
with children." This explanation mirrors FHC's allegation 
that 
 
       "each act of discrimination conducted in the Delaware 
       Valley causes a setback to the good work accomplished 
       by the FHC's educational and outreach efforts and to 
       the development of an integrated housing community. 
       As a result, the FHC must launch further efforts to 
       undo the damage that the discrimination has caused." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We do not confuse this with a "scintilla of evidence" which is 
unquestionably insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 
(1986). In this case, the FHC has presented sufficient evidence to allow 
a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor on the issue of 
standing 
to sue under the Fair Housing Act. 
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(Pl.'s Am. Comp. P 10.) The FHC also prepared a detailed 
plan entitled "Appellants' Statement of Proposed Education- 
Repair Campaign." The purpose of the plan is to reach, 
among others, consumers, housing providers, and real 
estate professionals to counteract advertisements that leave 
readers believing that it is legal to turn away families with 
children. The "Proposed Plan" explains what the FHC 
alleges: a large-scale educational campaign is necessary 
because the continued publication of illegal advertisements 
causes an "overwhelming misunderstanding" about the Act. 
The Plan is specific to the extent that it contains sample 
advertisements to be placed in Montgomery Newspapers, 
the frequency of planned publication, a proposed budget for 
executing the Plan, and details of educational efforts other 
than newspaper advertisements. 
 
The majority states that the only evidence relating to the 
educational effort produced by the FHC was "an allegation 
that, at some future time, it would be required to spend 
almost $100,000 in newspaper advertising and more than 
$300,000 in seminars and mailings to reach consumers to 
counter the advertisements' discriminatory message." This 
statement is incorrect, based on the substantial record 
evidence. 
 
B. The need for corrective action 
 
The majority's conclusion crumbles upon examination of 
the entire Proposed Plan and explanations of the FHC staff, 
discussed above. By focusing only on the necessity to 
educate home seekers and consumers, the majority 
overlooks an entire segment of the FHC's mission: to 
educate publishers and housing providers. Montgomery 
Newspapers published discriminatory ads, which itself 
demonstrates that housing providers and the newspaper do 
not understand the terms of the Fair Housing Act. Because 
the FHC aims to ensure compliance by education, it must 
now divert resources to redress that damage. Thus, I am 
compelled to conclude that the FHC has suffered the 
requisite "identifiable trifle" of injury to its educational 
programs. 
 
The FHC has demonstrated that its educational plan is a 
necessary response to correct the discriminatory 
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advertisements published by Montgomery Newspapers. The 
"Proposed Plan" explains that, among others, real estate 
professionals are ignorant of the family status provisions of 
the Fair Housing Act. Advertisements that contain 
comments such as "no children or pets," and "professional 
male need only apply" exemplify this ignorance. The FHC 
intends to reach consumers to explain the Fair Housing 
Act. However, the majority fails to recognize that the FHC 
also plans to explain Fair Housing Act compliance to 
housing providers and real estate professionals, who place 
and read advertisements in Montgomery Newspapers and 
perpetuate discriminatory advertising. 
 
The majority suggests that the FHC would have satisfied 
standing requirements if it could show that home seekers 
have actually been barred from housing, deterred from 
seeking housing, or formed a misimpression about housing 
availability as a result of the advertisements published in 
the Montgomery Newspapers. This is simply incorrect. An 
aggrieved home seeker is not necessary to show a violation 
of section 3604. Housing providers and newspapers violate 
42 U.S.C. S 3604(c) upon publication. The Fair Housing Act 
expressly empowers organizations like the FHC to enforce 
its provisions without joining a home seeker as a co- 
plaintiff, 42 U.S.C. SS 3602, 3613, in the federal district 
courts, 42 U.S.C. S 3613(a)(1)(A), to seek the award of 
actual or punitive damages or the grant of permanent or 
temporary injunctive relief. 42 U.S.C. S 3613(c)(1). 
 
C. Imminent and Concrete Injury 
 
The FHC has successfully adduced facts to show concrete 
injury that is certainly impending, as required by Lujan. 
504 U.S. at 564. The majority concludes that the FHC 
would be injured if it already implemented the educational 
program. This is not correct. The cases are legion 
supporting a conclusion that the FHC is not required to 
actually pay for the advertising campaign before it can 
assert standing. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 
U.S. 1, 8, 108 S. Ct. 849, 855 (1988) (holding that because 
it is not unduly speculative to conclude that the ordinance 
at issue will be enforced against members of the 
Association, this is a sufficient threat of actual injury to 
satisfy Article III); Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 
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298, 99 S. Ct. 2301, 2308 (1979) ("A plaintiff who 
challenges a statute must demonstrate a realistic danger of 
sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's 
operation or enforcement."); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978) 
(Plaintiff alleged that, if constructed, the power plant's 
operation would cause the emission of radiation. The Court 
held that the plaintiff's alleged injury was sufficiently 
concrete to confer standing.); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 
262 U.S. 553, 593, 43 S. Ct. 658, 663 (1923) ("[O]ne does 
not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to 
obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending, 
that is enough."); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 
964-65 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that clinics not actually 
blockaded by defendant organization had standing because 
the threat that defendants would blockade the clinics in the 
future was real and immediate); Public Interest Research 
Group, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 
1990) (plaintiffs' asserted injury, that they would use the 
water for boating and aesthetic enjoyment if it was not 
polluted, was sufficient to confer standing, even though 
they had not used the water in its polluted state). 
 
The FHC also satisfies Lujan by setting forth concrete 
plans for its educational program. The majority categorizes 
the FHC plan as the "some day" intentions prohibited by 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S. Ct. at 2138, and 
suggests that the FHC has proffered no concrete plans or 
specifications as to when the plans will be carried out. I 
disagree. In Lujan, the Supreme Court suggested that had 
the plaintiffs actually purchased a plane ticket, their plans 
to observe the endangered species would not be "some-day 
intentions." Id. Here, the plan submitted by the FHC is 
more extensive and expensive than the mere plane ticket in 
Lujan. 
 
Moreover, the majority's conclusion is at odds with the 
Supreme Court's holding in Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., wherein mere blueprints 
and building plans were sufficient to confer standing on a 
non-profit housing organization. 429 U.S. 252, 261, 97 S. 
Ct. 555, 561 (1977). The housing organization in Arlington 
Heights planned to build low income housing to further its 
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interest in making low cost housing available in areas 
where it was scarce, but its plans were thwarted when the 
local government denied its zoning request. The Court held 
that the organization's plans to build, and its related goals, 
were not an abstract concern and provided the essential 
dimension of specificity required to determine standing at 
trial. Id. at 263. The situation of the FHC is analogous. The 
FHC plans to educate the public that discrimination based 
on familial status is illegal. That plan is equally specific and 
detailed, and therefore sufficient to confer standing. 
 
III. Investigation Injury 
 
The FHC also adduced evidence sufficient to confer 
standing for a 42 U.S.C. S 3604(c) violation based on the 
costs to investigate the housing advertisements in the 
Montgomery Newspapers. alleged in the complaint 
constitute injury for standing purposes). Havens found 
"injury in fact" when a fair housing organization had to 
divert resources to "identify and counteract" discriminatory 
practices. 455 U.S. at 379, 102 S. Ct. at 1124. Like 
"educational injury," the courts following Havens agree that 
costs incurred investigating violations of the Fair Housing 
Act can confer standing. See, e.g., Hooker v. Weathers, 990 
F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1993) (costs incurred in the 
investigation to confirm the facts and circumstances). 
 
The majority erroneously concludes that the FHC 
investigation cannot confer standing because it was a 
regular part of the day-to-day operations of the 
organization. It cites "depositions of FHC staff" in support 
of this conclusion. Indeed, there was some suggestion in 
the deposition of Jan Chadwick that reviewing housing 
advertisements was a regular matter of business for FHC 
staffers. However, based on the evidence, one could also 
reasonably conclude that the FHC investigation followed 
violations of 42 U.S.C. S 3604(c), and because of repeated 
violations, became a daily function of the FHC. For 
standing purposes, we look only for an "identifiable trifle" of 
injury, so the FHC need only submit evidence to create a 
genuine issue of whether it diverted the slightest amount of 
additional time to read the Montgomery Newspapers. U.S. v. 
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 
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U.S. 669, 689 n.14, 93 S. Ct. 2405, 2417 n.14 (1973). I 
believe they have met this burden. 
 
The FHC made a specific showing of its increased efforts 
to identify and eventually counteract discriminatory ads 
under 42 U.S.C. S 3604(c). The record shows that 
investigation efforts began in 1989, when the FHC began 
reviewing the housing advertisements in the Montgomery 
Newspapers. The investigation was prompted by the FHC's 
discovery that despite a recent amendment to the Fair 
Housing Act, local papers did not comply with the 
provisions prohibiting discrimination on the basis of family 
status. The FHC filed charges with the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission and the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, but the illegal 
advertisements continued. The graph submitted by the FHC 
shows that the FHC devoted more resources to identify the 
discriminatory advertisements in the Montgomery 
Newspapers than it would have normally directed toward 
simply reviewing housing advertisements. The FHC also 
proffered the affidavit of Executive Director James Berry 
explaining the increased investigative efforts, and this was 
supported by the materials charting the resources 
dedicated to investigating the housing advertisements in 
the Montgomery News. 
 
Counsel for Montgomery Newspapers suggested during 
oral argument that the FHC could have sent testers to 
determine whether the ads were placed with the intention 
of discrimination on the basis of familial status. Certainly, 
that was one potential investigatory technique available to 
it. However, no one technique is required to establish 
standing. A violation of section 3604(c) occurs upon 
publication. This is distinguishable from a violation of 
section 3604(d), which occurs when misleading information 
is given to a tester. Naturally, one method of identifying 
violations under section 3604(c) is to read the newspaper. 
FHC did just that, and its efforts were intended to identify 
the pattern and practices of discriminatory conduct and to 
counteract it through legal pressure and education. 
 
Congress intended to confer broad rights to enforce the 
Fair Housing Act. See Havens, 455 U.S. at 374 n.14, 102 
S. Ct. at 1122 n.14. For example, a tester may pose as a 
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prospective purchaser, expect unlawful practices based on 
race, and have standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. S 3604(d) 
if the housing provider misrepresents the availability of 
housing. This is distinguishable from 42 U.S.C. S 3604(a), 
which requires a bona fide offer for housing to present a 
claim of a discriminatory refusal to sell or rent. However, 
like the tester provision, there is no "bona fide" requirement 
for enforcement of the advertisement provision. 
 
Nevertheless, the majority suggests that the investigation 
must be motivated by a complaint about advertising in the 
Montgomery Newspapers. This is not correct. Independent 
investigations not initiated by complaints were also a part 
of the regular activities of the fair housing organization in 
Havens. In Havens, the organization's activities included: 
 
       "conducting independent investigations of real estate 
       brokers located in the metropolitan area to determine 
       whether housing is being made available without 
       regard to race; and taking appropriate steps to 
       eliminate any racial discriminatory housing practices it 
       may have found to exist." 
 
Coles v. Havens Realty Corp., 633 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Cir. 
1980), aff'd sub. nom. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 
U.S. 363, 102 S. Ct. 1114 (1982). The Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit concluded that the drain on resources 
necessary to identify violations of the Fair Housing Act is 
sufficient to confer standing, irrespective of whether such 
investigation was motivated by a complaint. 
 
IV. Litigation Injury 
 
The FHC's "litigation injuries" in the form of attorneys' 
fees to bring this case are insufficient to impart standing 
under the Fair Housing Act, especially since the act 
provides for recovery of attorneys' fees. 42 U.S.C. 
S 3613(c)(2). My agreement with the majority stops there. 
 
Havens did not specifically decide whether the costs of 
litigation or enforcement of the Fair Housing Act are 
sufficient to confer standing. Arguably, this activity would 
fall under the category of activities intended to "counteract" 
discrimination. Courts from the Second and Seventh 
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Circuits have read Havens to confer standing even when 
resources are diverted for litigation purposes only. See, e.g., 
City of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Ctr., Inc., 
982 F.2d 1086, 1095 (7th Cir. 1992); Village of Bellwood v. 
Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990); Ragin v. 
Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 905 (2d Cir. 
1993). The majority does not find these cases persuasive, 
instead relying on the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit's conclusion that litigation costs alone 
cannot confer standing because it would allow litigants to 
achieve manufactured, or "purely self-referential injury" by 
merely filing the complaint. Fair Employment Council of 
Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 
1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 
F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 
In my opinion, the FHC has standing, even under the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's 
holdings, because many activities that fall between 
investigation and litigation can confer standing under 
Havens. For example, in this case, the FHC chose many 
non-litigation methods to apply legal pressure upon the 
Montgomery Newspapers to enforce the Fair Housing Act. 
The FHC filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human 
Resources Commission. In addition, the FHC attempted to 
notify the newspaper of its violations of section 3604 (c). My 
conclusion to confer standing upon fair housing 
organizations for enforcement activities, other than the 
filing of the lawsuit, does not conflict with the Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's cases that the majority finds 
persuasive. BMC Marketing and Spann only prohibit 
conferral of standing from the act of filing the lawsuit. 
 
My conclusion is also entirely consistent with the policies 
of the Fair Housing Act. First, Congress intended that 
groups like the FHC take action to enforce the provisions of 
the Fair Housing Act. If we do not recognize the efforts that 
precede litigation as injury, we will cramp the options now 
open to fair housing organizations that are laboring to 
counteract discrimination. Large scale, long term pre- 
litigation efforts that draw from program resources should 
constitute injury for standing purposes even if they 
culminate in litigation. Second, I see little danger that 
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plaintiffs may "manufacture standing" in the context of the 
Fair Housing Act. It is not that easy. The greater danger is 
exaggerating the risk of nullifying Article III, and thereby 
eviscerating the statutory scheme of the Fair Housing Act, 
which clearly relies upon private enforcement to ensure 
compliance. 
 
The FHC correctly states that the Fair Housing Act relies 
upon private attorneys general to enforce its provisions. See 
42 U.S.C. S 3613;3 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
409 U.S. 205, 210-211, 93 S. Ct. 364, 367-68 (1972) 
(noting the paucity of statutory remedies); Hooker v. 
Weathers, 990 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding 
standing under Havens due to the increase of resources 
devoted to programs independent of its suit challenging the 
action); Housing Opportunities Made Equal v. Cincinnati 
Enquirer, Inc., 943 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Courts 
have given a broad reading to the FHA in order to fulfill its 
remedial purpose."). Accordingly, we have an obligation to 
address the issue of standing (pursuant to "litigation 
injuries") so as to fulfill the private enforcement provisions 
of the Fair Housing Act. "We can give vitality to [The Fair 
Housing Act] only by a generous construction which gives 
standing to sue to all . . . who are injured by . . . 
discrimination . . . within the coverage of the statute." 
Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212, 93 S. Ct. at 368. We should 
carefully consider which "litigation injuries" confer standing 
to maintain the integrity of Article III, while still allowing 
fair housing organizations to fulfill their role as private 
attorneys general. Spann, 899 F.2d at 30 (citing Trafficante, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. A violation of the Fair Housing Act does not constitute per se injury 
to 
a fair housing organization. The FHC is mistaken, to the extent that it 
reads Bennett v. Spear to confer standing without meeting Article III 
requirements. ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997). Bennett discusses 
the "zone of interest test," a jurisprudential test for standing, which 
applies above and beyond the Article III. Id. at 1160 (stating Article III 
is 
an irreducible constitutional minimum). The "zone of interest test" does 
not apply to standing to pursue an action under the Fair Housing Act. 
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 US. 205, 209, 93 S. Ct. 
364, 
367 (1972). Despite its misinterpretation of Bennett, the Council has 
struck on an important point regarding their role in ensuring compliance 
with the Fair Housing Act. 
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409 U.S. at 211, 93 S.Ct. at 368). As explained above, I 
believe I have done so in this case: allowing the FHC's 
investigations and legal pressure, applied through letters or 
administrative proceedings to confer standing, but rejecting 
the theory that the FHC's costs to file this lawsuit can 
impart standing. 
 
Finally, we cannot overlook the will of the legislature in 
determining whether the FHC has standing to sue. Havens, 
455 U.S. at 373, 102 S. Ct. at 1121. The injury "required 
by Article III may exist solely by virtue of `statutes creating 
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.' " Id. 
(citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 
2205 (1975)). "The policies of the Act and the concrete 
injuries alleged by the plaintiff organizations thus 
intertwine to support plaintiffs' standing to bring this suit." 
Spann, 899 F.2d at 31 (citations omitted). Congress 
specifically endorsed the values that the FHC seeks to 
enforce and their methods of enforcement, in the Fair 
Housing Act: 
 
       "The Congress finds that (1) in the past half decade 
       there have been major legislative and administrative 
       changes in Federal fair housing and fair lending laws 
       and substantial improvements in the Nation's 
       understanding of discrimination in the housing 
       markets; . . . (9) the proven efficacy of private nonprofit 
       fair housing enforcement organizations and 
       community-based efforts makes support for these 
       organizations a necessary component of the fair 
       housing enforcement system." 
 
Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 102-550, Section 
905(a), 106 Stat. 3869 (1992). 
 
In sum, we should not so fear the possibility of 
"manufactured standing" that we set barriers artificially 
high and thereby nullify the private enforcement provisions 
of the Fair Housing Act. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
For all the foregoing reasons and upon all the foregoing 
grounds, I conclude that the FHC has standing to advance 
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a claim under 42 U.S.C. S3604(c). I would give the FHC its 
day in court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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